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Abstract.  The choice of the electoral system should be delegated to the citizens. However, citizens are not  sufficiently informed to 
choose the system directly. It is argued that they may instead state their preferences for two basic characteristics of a Parliament, i.e. 
Governability and Representativeness. It is then possible to choose the system through a purely technical procedure. An experiment 
illustrates the method. 
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1. Introduction. The  choice of the electoral system has many consequences. In another paper 
I briefly surveyed the literature, to find that at least sixteen  political or social  characteristics are 
affected (see Ortona, 2000).  It is difficult to assess separately the effect of an electoral system on  a 
specific characteristic; but even if we succeed, the weight to be assigned to each is a matter of 
subjective judgement -and Arrow and McKelvey
1  prohibit to pinpoint the best alternative.  Hence,  
the best electoral system does not exist. 
      The very impossibility of finding the solution that maximizes the "real" social utility 
function is a fundamental argument in favour of democracy. My opinion cannot prove to be righter 
than yours; hence let us find a procedural rule that decides what to do irrespectively of the content 
of the alternative and of the subjects that support them. No need to pursue the discussion further, 
this is enough to justify what follows: if the "best" electoral system does not exist, and if the best we 
can do in order to make a public choice is to resort to  a democratic rule, why not allow the voters to 
choose democratically among the possible systems? This is the argument of this paper. More 
precisely: we will try to reduce progressively the choice set  through reasonable assumptions, to the 
point that the choice may be made directly by voters (sects. 2 to 5). We will conclude with  an 
experiment of actual choice (sect. 6 to 8).  However, as we will see in section 9, this will not be  the 
end of the story.   
 
2. What may voters  vote about? To this point, the problem is "how to allow the voters to 
choose among electoral systems". The solution that comes immediately to mind is to let the voters  
vote on them. But this solution is not that viable. The electors usually do not know how an electoral 
system actually works, nor they are fully aware of their possible consequences.  To say it with 
Farrell (2001, p.184), "It is pretty clear that few people actually understand much about electoral 
systems, and therefore it is difficult to take seriously their responses". Also, some saliencies may 
well influence the choice. In 1993 Italian voters moved enthusiastically  (through a yes-no 
referendum) from proportional representation to a (mostly plural) mixed-member one, in a wave of 
outrage for the corruption of politicians. Apparently, they ignored the inconclusiveness of the 
literature on the link between electoral system and corruption, as well as the effects of such a 
change on other aspects more relevant than corruption. Proportional representation is presently 
gaining momentum in Italy; many see in it a suitable remedy to the same flaws that produced its 
                                                 
1 No need, I guess, to recall Arrow's theorem;  roughly speaking, McKelvey's states that if the choice is 
multidimensional the agenda-setter may normally establish the result. For a discussion, see f.i. Shepsle and 
Bonchek, 1997, p. 100.     4
refusal, which now are largely ascribed to plurality.  To be brief, the choice of the electoral systems 
involves some fundamental technical aspects that must be left to the judgement of the experts
2.  
    Let's proceed with an example. A well-functioning democracy requests the citizens to 
answer to the question "How much shall we devote to health care and how much to the army", but 
not to  questions like "do you prefer to invest X euros in radiotherapy and Y euros in deep-sea 
cruisers or B-Y euros in anti-radar missiles (provided that this has any meaning) and B'-X euros in 
vaccine therapy?" Given a budget constraint, we may say that voters are requested to state the 
relative weight that they assign to different  basic requirements, but not  the best way to implement 
them. The reason is that the citizens know whether they want more health care or more defence, but 
they do not know whether the suggested technical choices are those that best implement their 
wishes. In other words, if the democratic decision process works as it should work, citizens define 
the priorities, and technicians implement the choices that best correspond to these priorities. Once 
the (median) voters decided to spend X euros for defence, it is better if technicians decide how to 
use them. 
  There is no reason to modify this general procedure in the field of the choice of the electoral 
system. Voters should be interrogated about the relative importance that they assign  to different 
desirable characters of the electoral process, but not on the way to implement them. Hence, citizens 
should not choose among, say, Borda count or Condorcet method
3. Instead, they should decide on 
the relative weight to be assigned to the relevant characteristics affected by the electoral procedure. 
Once they performed this, it is a technical matter to pinpoint the system that best corresponds to the 
desiderata of voters.  
 
3. How many characteristics?  We saw that the electoral process affects a lot of 
characteristics. How many are relevant, and which ones? I suggest two, i. e. the efficiency in 
representing electors' will (representativeness, R) and the effect on the efficiency of the resulting 
government (governability, G). There is a very good reason to privilege R and G. To summon the 
citizens, through their  representatives, into an ideal assembly and to form a government are the 
basic duties of a Parliament (in addition to making laws)
4. Possible pitfalls of other dimensions may 
be managed in other moments of the political process, but this is not the case for representativeness 
                                                 
2 A viable compromise  could be to resort to the so-called deliberative democracy. We will return to this in 
section 9.  
3 This example is not taken by chance. As i is well known, Borda and Condorcet could not reach an 
agreement on the best system.  
4 I accept  the principle that the Parliament must be a "microcosm" of the society. As  is well known, this 
v i e w  i s  c h a l l e n g e d  b y  t h o s e  w h o  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t  m u s t  b e  d e s i g n e d  s o  a s  t o  o p t i m i z e  t h e  
incentives for their members instead (for a brief discussion see Farrell, 2001, p.165). In my opinion, this view 
is flawed. To create the right incentives for MPs is a matter of procedure; the "instead" is by no means 
necessary. However, to pursue  this point further goes far beyond the scope of this paper.    5
and governability, if we admit the sovereignty of the voters in choosing their representatives and 
that of the representatives in choosing the government. To give an example, we saw that corruption 
is probably affected by the electoral system, albeit it is not clear how. Now suppose that electoral 
system A performs better than system B with respect both to representativeness and governability, 
but worse with respect to corruption. It is possible and advisable (for the abstract, benevolent 
Constitutional Legislator) to choose A and to adopt suitable anti-corruption policies. But it is 
probably  not possible (nor advisable to try) to choose B and to enhance governability and 
representativeness  outside  the electoral procedure, as they are entangled, so to speak, to that 
procedure. In other words, it is sensible to think that other facets are lexicographically subordinate 
with respect to R and G. If this is so, the results obtained with reference to R and G will keep their 
validity irrespective of their effect on other aspects judged relevant. 
 
4.    How to measure R and G? R and G may be measured through suitable indicators, 
provided that the data necessary to build them are available.  The indices to be employed must be 
meaningful, but also sufficiently simple to be understood by ordinary people. Consequently, we will 
adopt the following ones. The index or representativeness, r, is simply  the percent share of seats 
assigned according to the share of first preferences. The distribution of first preferences may be 
proxied by the distribution of seats under pure proportionality with an unique district (or large 
ones). In our experiment, we used nation-wide representative survey data. As for the index of 
governability, g, the common wisdom is that governability increases if the number of parties in the 
governing coalition decreases and the number of seats increases
5. Hence the value of the index is 
simply  the share (%) of seats of the governing coalition divided by the number of  parties that 
support it. Note that both indices range from 1 to 100.  
   In table 1 there is an example.  
 
Table 1: two hypothetical electoral systems with three parties. 
Party  Share (%) of 
First Preferences 
Share (%) of Seats 
under pure 
proportionality 
Share  (%) of Seats 
Under System X 
Share (%) of Seats 
Under System Y 
A 40  40  30  40 
B 50  50  65  48 
C 10  10  5  12 
 
Consider system X. Were the seats distributed as the first preferences, Party A would keep all 
its seats, party B would lose 15%  and party C would keep its 5%. Hence 15% of seats are allocated 
                                                 
5 Note, however, that many authors (including the author of this paper) do not agree. See f.i. Lijphart (1999) 
or Farrell (2001).   6
not according to the distribution of first preferences, and the value of r is 85. Analogously, under 
system Y only 2% of seats are misallocated, and the value of r is 98. Under system X, the 
government will be formed by party B, with 65 seats and the value of g will be 65; while under 
system Y it will be formed (presumably) by parties B and C, and the value of g will be only 30
6.  
Note that there is a trade-off between R and G. 
  Obviously, to compare electoral systems we need to compute out the seat assignment for 
each system given the same set of preferences.  This may be done through simulation, as we will see 
in section 6.  
 
5.  A social utility function in r and g; and a choice criterion. Up to now, we managed to 
reduce the choice space to two dimensions. The next step is to obtain a rule to compose the two.  To 
begin with, let's assume that there is a social utility function U(R,G), measured by u(r,g), with both 
first derivatives positive. Next, let's assume a specific form for this function; to be precise, that U is 
a Cobb-Douglas function, U = Ag
ar
b. This is probably the most audacious step of the whole 
procedure; however, there are three good reasons why a Cobb-Douglas function may do the job, in 
addition to its well-known versatility. 
  First, a and b are the partial elasticities of U with respect to r and g. If you are not familiar 
with the notion of elasticity, this means that if the value of, say, b is, say, 0.4, an increase by 1% in 
the value of r makes the utility grow by 0.4%. Hopefully, this makes the parameters readable for the 
ordinary citizen.  
  The second reason is a little more complicated, but also more relevant. Consider the ratio 
a/b, call it p. It is the price in terms of a relative decrease of r that the  community accepts to pay for 
a given relative increase of g (and 1/p the opposite). If for instance p =2, it is worthwhile to accept a 
20% reduction of r to gain a 10% increase in g
7.   
   Finally, with a Cobb-Douglas function the specific form of g and r becomes less cogent.  
Suppose that, for whatever reason, we decide that the values of g must be replaced by wg,  and 
those of r by  zr. The price of a relative increase of g  is [d(zr)/(zr)]/[(dwg)/(wg)], but this ratio is 
                                                 
6 Here and below I assume that the government is always formed by a minimum winning coalition of parties 
adjacent on the left-right axis; if more than one qualifies, the winner is the one with most seats. For a brief 
discussion of the MWC hypothesis, see Martelli, 1999, ch. 9.   
7 Here is the proof. from U = Agarb and a =pb we get   
dU = dg(bpAgbp-1rb) + dr(bAgbprb-1) 
If U does not change 
0 = dg(bpAgbp-1rb) + dr(bAgbprb-1) 
dg(bpAgbp-1rb) = -dr(bAgbprb-1) 
dr/r = -p(dg/g)  
Note that all this implies that if G is very high it is worth paying a small increase in R with a large decrease 
in G, and vice-versa, as it should be.   7
equal to [dr/r]/[dg/g], the price with the original values.  In addition, it is obvious that given two 
electoral systems X and Y  
  


















Hence, this inequality provides a choice criterion not only for r and g but also for the whole 
set of indices wg and zr, with w and z>0. 
 
   The value of p=a/b is of great importance for our discussion, as it permits to reduce the 
choice problem to the evaluation of a single figure, as follows. From [1] and [2] we get 
 
  




hence the condition may be written as  
 









6. The choice experiment. Now the choice problem is simple enough to be managed by the 
voters. In principle, it may be solved either by a meta-decisor (like a Constitutional Benevolent 
Legislator), or by the voters themselves on the basis of their preference and of some decision 
method; I will discuss mostly the second approach, which is the main topic of this paper, while the 
first will be briefly addressed in the final section.  
   Several methods may be employed to collect the information necessary to evaluate p. In the 
following sections I will discuss three, and  I will present the results of an experiment.  The figures   8
for r and g for 22 electoral systems and for a unique set of preferences were obtained through 
simulation, by means of a quite powerful simulation program developed at the Laboratory for 
Experimental and Simulative Economics of the Università del Piemonte Orientale. The  input was a 
representative survey of electoral preferences of Italian citizens collected by the Osservatorio del 
Nord Ovest of the Università di Torino in the first quarter of  2004
8. To avoid long digressions, the 
technicalities of the simulation are in appendix, and I do not describe the program as it is illustrated 
in detail elsewhere
9.  The main data are in table 2. 
 
Table 2. r and g for 22 electoral systems, Italy, 2004. 
 
System  g   share of seats of the 
governing coalition 
(rounded) (+) 
number of parties of 
the governing coalition 
(+) 
r  
1  Borda  27.5  55  2  66 
2  Runoff plurality  30.0  60  2  66 
3  Plurality  23.3  70  3  74 
4  Mix-sc. (°)  20.7  61  3  85 
5  Mixed (°)  20.7  62  3  82 
6  Prop., 1 district  10.4  52  5   100 
7  Threshold Prop.(§)  17.0  51  3  87 
8  Condorcet  29.5  59  2  70 
9  Prop. Hare (^)  13.5  54  4  92 
10  Prop. Imp. (^)  8.7  52  6  88 
11  Prop. SL (^)  13.5  54  4  94 
12  Prop. DH (^)  18.0  54  3  84 
13  STV NB (^)  10.6  53  5  94 
14  STV D (^)  10.8  54  5  95 
15  STV H (^)  10.8  54  5  91 
16  Prop.Hare (&)  10.6  53  5  99 
17  Prop. Imp. (&)  10.6  53  5  99 
18  Prop. SL (&)  10.8  54  5  98 
19  Prop. DH  (&)  10.4  52  5   96 
20  Mix-sc (&)  17.7  53  3  91 
21  Mixed  (&)  19.0  57  3  87 
22  Thresh. prop. (§,&)  10.6  53  5  96 
 
Notes to  table 2 
 
prop.=pure proportionality; STV=single transferable vote; Imp =Imperiali; S =Sainte-lague; DH=D'Hondt. 
(+)  Simulations were performed with 100 seats; this produced immediately the share of seats, albeit rounded. 
(°) 25 seats assigned through one-district proportionality, 75 through plurality. "Sc" (for the Italian word scorporo) 
means that votes used for the proportional share are not considered for the assignment of the plurality seats. 
(§) 5%. 
(^) Ten ten seat districts.   
(&) Five twenty seat districts. The program ran out of memory for STV. 
                                                 
8 I take the opportunity to thank the director of the Osservatorio, prof. Luca Ricolfi, for his kind permission 
to employ these data.  
9 See Bissey, Carini and Ortona, 2004.   9
 
    The choice set may be considerably reduced through the exclusion of systems that are 
dominated or weakly dominated. A system is dominated when there is another one  with higher 
values for both g and r, or with a higher value for one of the two figures and the same for the other; 
and is weakly dominated when both figures have the same value. This criterion reduces 
considerably the list; we are left with the 10 systems of table 3. 
 
Table 3 Systems of table 2 surviving the elimination of dominated or weakly dominated systems. 
 
System  g   r  
2  Runoff plurality  30.0  66 
3  Plurality  23.3  74 
4  Mix-sc.   20.7  85 
6  Prop., 1 district  10.4  100 
8  Condorcet  29.5  70 
11 Prop. SL   1 3.5  94 
17  Prop. Imp.   10.6  99 
18  Prop. SL   10.8  98 
20  Mix-sc   17.7  91 




7. Voting for the electoral system. In the experiment, participants were briefly instructed on 
the meaning of representativeness and governability, and on how the indices g and r  were 
computed. Then they were asked to answer  the following questions: 
 
a) System A has a value of 50 for both r and g. System B has a value of 60 for g. What value 
must B have for r, so that you are indifferent between A and B? 
b) System A has a value of 50 for both r and g. System B has a value of 40 for g. What value 
must B have for r, so that you are indifferent between A and B? 
 
The answers to each question allow for two procedures to compute the individual values of 
a/b, a(i)/b(i); hence we have four estimates. I illustrate them with reference to question a); the 
extension to question b) is straightforward.  







   10
For a(i)/b(i), where ri is the answer provided by  participant i.    
 
   The second applies the procedure of fn. 7, albeit with some roughness, due to the to the use 
of differentials to estimate large variations. The answer to the question provides an estimate of dr 
and dg; hence we may obtain the value of  a(i)/b(i) = p(i) from the identity 
 
dr/r = -p(dg/g). 
 
  Results are summarized in  table 4
10. 
 
Table 4. Estimates of a/b 
 




First, question a  0.833  0.675  84 
First, Question b  0.607  0.367  89 
Second, question a  0.674  0.501  84 
Second, question b  0.744  0.470  89 
Mean of the four 
procedures 
0.696 0.402  80 
 
   As we saw, a system X is preferred to a system Y if  (a/b) >  ln(ry/rx)/ln(gx/gy), where X is 
the one with the greater value of g, while if (a/b) < ln(ry/rx)/ln(gx/gy), then Y is preferred to X.  In 
table 5 there are the values of ln(ry/rx)/ln(gx/gy) for every couple of systems of table 3. The value of 
g of the system in row is always greater than those of the systems in columns; hence, given the 
value of a/b, we may immediately read the preferred system for any couple.   
 
Table 5  Threshold values of a/b ( Numbers as in tables 2 and 3). 
. 
System      2  8  3  4  21 20  11 18 17 6 
2   3.501 0.452 0.681  0.604 0.609  0.443 0.387 0.390 0.392
8     0.235 0.548  0.494 0.513  0.377 0.334 0.339 0.342
3      1.171  0.793 0.752  0.438 0.365  0.369  0.373
4       0.271 0.436  0.235 0.219  0.228  0.236
21         0.634  0.226 0.211  0.221  0.231
20           0.120 0.150  0.164  0.177
11           0.187  0.214  0.237
18             0.543  0.535
17              0.527
                                                 
10   In principle, the four methods should provide the same results. Hence, the difference of the results may 
be read as an estimate of the relevance of framing effects. We'll come back on this in section 9.   
11 I excluded incoherent answers, i.e. answers where a (say) increase in g is compensated with an increase in 
r. Participants were 110.   11
   Comparing the values of a/b with the threshold values of table 5, we obtain the preferred 
system for each participant (I considered only the averages of the four procedures). This is 
tantamount to saying that participants vote for the electoral systems; the results are:  
 
Pure proportionality                  21.3% 
Mix-sc (5 districts)                   15.0% 
Mix-sc  (10 districts)                  6.3%  
Condorcet                                 57.4% 
 
And (following the plurality rule) the system to be adopted is Condorcet. Note that this result 




8. A further and simpler procedure. The result of the previous section rests on the revealed 
preference for p. It is sensible to argue that this revelation may be affected by any sort of framing 
effects or  misunderstandings; in this section I will employ  a more arbitrary  but probably sounder 
procedure. 
   Subjects must first be requested to state a minimum threshold for g and r, meaning that 
systems scoring less for one of them (or both) should not adopted, irrespectively of the value of the 
other; the average value is assumed as the one in effect. Also, they must decide (following the 
majority rule) whether r is more important than g, or vice-versa
12. Then four results may obtain.  
   First, (and fortunately) only one system is over both thresholds. This is obviously the one to 
be chosen. 
   Second, all systems are below both thresholds. In this case, the system to be chosen is the 
one with the highest value of r or g according to which is more important.  
      Third, several system are over one threshold, while all are below the other; or, fourth, 
several system are over both thresholds. The procedure I suggest, a quasi-minimax method,  is the 
same in both cases. As this is the case in our experiment, I will illustrate it with its data
13. 
   The average minimum value of r is 48, and of g is 42
14. No system in table 3 satisfies the 
requirement for g, while all satisfy that for r. Also, 34 subjects claimed that G is more important 
                                                 
12 In the experiment the question was: "To you, which is more important, Representativeness or 
Governability?" With six possible answers, much more important Representativeness (Governability), 
somewhat more important Representativeness (Governability), equally important, don't know.   12
than R, and 35 the contrary.  A simple minimax rule would suggest to adopt the system  with the 
highest value of  g among those that satisfy the requirement for r.  However, this method may trade 
off high increases in r for small gains  in g: in our example it pinpoints runoff, with 30 for g and 66 
for r, while Condorcet may provide 77 for r with as much as 29.5 for g. A more advisable procedure 
is to divide the systems according to the number of parties that may form the majority. Within each 
group the values of g will be very close; the system to be adopted is the one that (a) respects the 
basic requirement for r (r >48, in our case) and (b) has the highest value of r in the group of 
systems with the highest values of g. In our case it will be (again) Condorcet; the other systems of 
the same group are runoff and Borda (which is dominated, with g = 27.5 and r = 66).  If the binding 
constraint is that on g, suppose for instance g>20 with a majority claiming that G is more relevant, 
the procedure suggests to pick the system with the highest value of r in the group with the highest 
values of g (in our case, that of 2-party governments).  
   Before leaving this topic, note that the occurrence of too high thresholds should not be 





9. Final comments. The differences among the values for a/b obtained from the four methods 
are high, mostly if we consider the  standard deviations. This indicates that the framing of the 
questions is relevant, not to speak of a lot of possible biases (information, selection, etc.) that may 
occur if we move to a representative sample.  Hence, the indications of the experiment are mixed. 
We obtained a clear-cut result through a procedure that appears justifiable; but  the possibility to 
assess for real the value of a/b through a democratic procedure is still quite remote. However,  the 
approach of this paper may be useful to tackle, both analytically and empirically, an important 
topic, that has received  too little consideration in the debate on the choice of the electoral system: 
that of the preferences of the voters on the matter
16. To this aim, the inquiry of this paper could be 
developed along three lines. First, to improve its  (very preliminary) results by resorting to the so-
called  deliberative democracy. As is well known (see f.i. Bosetti and Maffettone, 2004) this 
approach aims to produce a decision by a representative sample of informed subjects. The field of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
13 Again, I excluded incoherent answers, i.e. answers that claimed (for instance) that R is more important 
than G, while answering (for instance) that in order to keep  utility unaffected a decrease of 20% in g must be 
compensated with an increase in R greater than 20%.  
14 The questions were: "Complete the following sentence. A system with a value for Governability 
(Representativeness) lower than … must be rejected in any case".   
15 Actually, in this paper I did not consider two  systems (not used in the real world) that produced r and g 
both over the chosen thresholds, i.e. VAP system (see Bissey, Carini and Ortona, 2004) and prized-plurality 
system with a prize sufficient to allow the largest party to govern alone. 
16 For an introductory  discussion, see Farrell, 2001, p. 183 ff.   13
this paper is clearly one where  information  may substantially  improve the reliability of the 
answers
17. Second, to further improve the criterion to rank-order electoral systems on the basis of 
the preference for R and G, starting from the discussion in section 8. It goes without saying that all 
this may be implemented only through simulation, as it requires to compare different electoral 
systems across the same set of preferences. Further improvements of the simulation program (also 
to include additional systems) will be useful. Finally, the decision on the relative weight of a and b 
could be delegated to a Constitutional Legislator (hopefully benevolent), on the basis of theoretical 
considerations. The availability of an "official" value  of p could allow to choose the electoral 
system after the vote. This would guarantee the right choice, and would help contrasting the rent-
catching on the electoral systems (see the introductory chapters of Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001).  
I do not make suggestions on this point, as this is not the subject of this paper.  
   Finally, I must emphasize a serious weakness of this paper, i.e. the uncertain reliability of 
index g. While it is natural to define r as the share of seats misallocated, the definition of g rests on 
the assumption that the governability increases if the number of parties in the governing coalition 
decreases. As we saw, this assumption is quite debated, and not  well established empirically. A 
better definition of g is desirable, and it could arguably modify the results of this paper; but this 
conclusion holds for the whole theoretical debate on electoral systems. 
 
 
Appendix. Data and simulations. The  simulations have been produced by ALEX3, a 
program developed at the Laboratory for Experimental and Simulative Economics of the Università 
del Piemonte Orientale in Alessandria, Italy. For a description, see Bissey, Carini and Ortona, 2004. 
Input data have been provided by a representative, nation-wide survey of electoral preferences in 
Italy performed in the first quarter of 2004 by the Osservatorio del Nord Ovest (Università di 
Torino), with 5347 valid observations.  15 parties were listed, plus a comprehensive item "others" 
(with 0.8% of first preferences altogether). For computing reasons I excluded  six with less than 
1.5% of preferences, for a total of 4.8%
18. Note that the rankings of several parties are closely 
correlated; actually, a latent-class procedure performed on the same data suggests that real parties 
are only seven (see Di Pasquale, 2002). The first preferences have been employed as votes. 
Condorcet, Borda and STV require a full ordering of preferences for each voter. These orderings are 
generated by the program, through a couple of parameters that fix the probability that the second 
                                                 
17 A focus-group exercise made in the UK in 1998 produced a sharp change in opinions after a two hour 
discussion,  from quite rough to more elaborate opinions. See Farrell and Gallagher, 1999. 
18 The number of parties affects the processing capabilities of the program irrespectively of their votes, due to 
the combinatorial computing requested by Condorcet, Borda and STV. A new version of the program 
(ALEX4), close to be completed, will allow to process many more cases.   14
preferred party is next or second-to-next to the first one on the left-right axis
19. Survey data allow to 
fix the first parameter, through the answer to the question "would you consider to vote for party X". 
The party with most answers "yes" has been considered the second preferred party. On the average, 
the probability of choosing as second preferred party a party adjacent to the first one resulted 0.70, 
and this is the value of the first parameter. That of the second has been fixed arbitrarily at the 
default value of the program, 0.2. For STV, the program requires also the probability that the 
second preferred candidate belongs to the  preferred party; lacking this information, this value has 
been arbitrarily set at the default value, 0.9
20. The program considers the geographical concentration 
of votes; the requested parameters (number of constituencies where the party is concentrated and 
concentration factor
21) have been estimated through the real data of the election of 2001.  I 
supposed 100 plurality districts, each with 100 (virtual) voters. Resulting data are summarized in 
table A, where parties are listed left to right and defined by their official acronym, when existing. 
Finally,  note that the indices produced by a typical output of the simulation program are slightly 
different from the ones employed here. I modified them as they are  less readable for ordinary 
subjects
22.   
 
Table A. Summary input data. 
 
Party  Votes  (%)  Number of districts 




PRC 6.36  12  1.43 
Green 4.67  -  - 
DS 22.60  22  1.68 
DL ("Daisy")  13.76  9  1.32 
Italy of the Values  4.16  -  - 
UDC 3.77  -  - 
FI 22.34  4  1.28 
LN 8.18  31  2.76 
AN 14.16  21  1.47 
 
                                                 
19 Here and below, the procedure is iterated until the full ordering is generated. 
20 Here and above, all the residual probabilities are uniformly distributed.  
21 The concentration factor of a party in a district is the ratio between the share of votes of that party in the 
district and nation-wide. I considered only the parties and the districts were the factor was greater than 1.25. 
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